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We study optimal monetary policy in a model in which ￿at money and private debt
coexist as a means of payment. The credit system is endogenous and allows buyers to
relax their cash constraints. However, it is costly for agents to publicly report their
trades, which is necessary for the enforcement of private liabilities. If it is too costly
for the government to obtain information regarding private transactions, then it relies
on the public information generated by the private credit system. If not all private
transactions are publicly reported, the government has imperfect public information to
implement monetary policy. In this case, we show that there is no incentive-feasible
policy that can implement the socially e¢ cient allocation. Finally, we characterize the
optimal policy for an economy with a low record-keeping cost and a large number of
public transactions, which results in a positive long-run in￿ ation rate.
JEL classi￿cation: E4, E5.
Keywords: Fiat money; private credit; costly record-keeping; imperfect public infor-
mation; optimal monetary policy.
11. INTRODUCTION
Recent work on the microfoundations of monetary economics has emphasized anonymous
trade as an essential ingredient for making ￿at money socially valuable; see Kocherlakota
(1998). However, anonymity makes the implementation of monetary policy di¢ cult because
any transfer scheme to anonymous agents is challenging to carrying out. Thus, it is crucial
to study the design of optimal monetary policy in an environment in which anonymity also
constrains the set of feasible choices for the government. This aspect of monetary policy
implementation has not been fully exploited by the literature and motivates our work.1
We consider an environment in which the government lacks the technology to verify
agents￿identity and observe their private trades. As a result, it necessarily relies on the
public information voluntarily created by the private sector to implement monetary policy.
Thus, all government taxes or transfers are constrained to being conditional on the available
public information.2 Our analysis builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and
Wright (2005). However, we relax the assumption that all trades are necessarily anonymous.
In our environment, the private sector has access to a costly technology that allows agents to
publicly report their trades. As a result, private agents may be willing to voluntarily report
(at a cost) their trades, together with their identities, to others if such an action allows
them to have access to credit. Because agents cannot commit to their future promises, it is
necessary to have public information to enforce the repayment of private liabilities through
societal punishments.3 Thus, credit arrangements may compete with ￿at money as a means
of payment when agents voluntarily report their trades.
The record-keeping technology to which private agents have access in our model is similar
to the one in Monnet and Roberds (2008); Nosal and Rocheteau (2009); and Li (2011). In
1An exception is a recent paper by Deviatov and Wallace (2010). They study incentive-feasible policies
in a model with indivisible money. In our paper, we use a model with divisible money.
2In reality, it is very likely that the government has imperfect information regarding private trades when
designing and implementing policies.
3See Kocherlakota (1998); Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998); Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999); and Araujo
and Camargo (2009).
2particular, a subset of sellers have the ability to verify the identity of their trading partners
and report their trades to other agents in the economy. If a buyer trades with one of these
sellers, then he can choose whether he wants to have his trade reported to others at a cost.
If the buyer chooses to report his trade, then he can induce the seller to produce more goods
than what his money balances allow him to purchase because he can also promise to make
a repayment at a future date.
In our environment, not only do public transactions allow credit arrangements within
the private sector, but they also permit the government to e⁄ectively alter the rate of
return on money. As in Andolfatto (2010), we restrict attention to policies that respect
voluntary trade, such as interest payments on money holdings, so that money becomes an
interest-bearing liability for the government. Given that not all bilateral trades are publicly
observable (due to technological restrictions), not all agents are able to receive interest
payments from the government on their money holdings. In other words, injections of ￿at
money are asymmetric.
We characterize the optimal policy rule with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences for an economy with a su¢ ciently low record-keeping cost and with a large
measure of sellers with the ability of making their trades publicly observable. We show that
there is a threshold value for the money growth rate below which the credit system is not
used in equilibrium because there is no incentive-compatible repayment amount that can be
promised to the sellers. Above the threshold value for the money growth rate, the monetary
authority is able to induce agents to report their trades by o⁄ering interest payments to those
agents who make their trades publicly observable. As a result, the private credit system is
operative and produces public information on which the monetary authority can condition
its injections of money. However, the socially e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented
by any incentive-feasible policy if not all sellers in the economy have the ability to publicly
report their trades.
Finally, we show that the government￿ s optimal policy is unable to eliminate consumption
risk: A buyer who has access to credit consumes more than a buyer who is paired with a
seller who is unable to make her trade publicly observable (in which case credit is not
3available). Because not all trades are publicly observable and, as a result, injections of
￿at money are asymmetric, the monetary authority cannot increase the rate of return on
money so that those who trade exclusively with currency can purchase the socially e¢ cient
quantity. Essentially, monetary policy is unable to induce agents to carry more money into
the goods market because it cannot eliminate the opportunity cost of holding money over
time. Finally, we show that the optimal policy results in a positive long-run in￿ ation rate
and a positive nominal interest rate.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Agents
There is a continuum of in￿nitely lived buyers and sellers. Each buyer is indexed by
i 2 [0;1] and each seller is indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Time is discrete and each period is divided
into two subperiods: day and night. Within each subperiod, there is a unique perishable
consumption good that is produced and consumed. In the day subperiod, a seller does not
want to consume but can produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of labor.
Instead the buyer wants to consume but is unable to produce. At night, both types want to
consume and are able to produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of labor.
Neither a buyer nor a seller can commit to his or her promises.
A buyer has preferences given by:
u(qi) + ci ￿ ni, (1)
where qi 2 R+ is consumption in the day subperiod, ci is consumption in the night subpe-
riod, and ni 2 R is production in the night subperiod. Assume that u : R+ ! R+ is strictly
concave, increasing, and continuously di⁄erentiable, with u(0) = 0 and u0 (0) = 1.
A seller has the following utility function over goods and e⁄ort:
￿qj + cj ￿ nj, (2)
where qj 2 R+ is production in the day subperiod, cj is consumption in the night subperiod,
4and nj 2 R is production in the night subperiod. Buyers and sellers have a common discount
factor between periods, which we denote by ￿ 2 (0;1).
2.2. Markets
Agents trade in two sequential markets every period. In the day market, agents are
randomly and bilaterally matched so that each buyer meets a seller. In the night market,
agents interact in a centralized location where the terms of trade are given by competitive
pricing.
2.3. Recordkeeping
There are two types of sellers: connected and unconnected. A connected seller has access
to a record-keeping technology that allows her to verify the identity of her trading partner
and record her transaction in the day subperiod. Once a transaction is recorded, it can be
reported to other agents in the economy. The use of this technology costs ￿ > 0 units of the
consumption good for the seller in the day subperiod. An unconnected seller does not have
access to a record-keeping technology and, therefore, is unable to make her interaction with
her trading partner publicly observable. There is a measure ￿ 2 [0;1] of connected sellers
and a measure 1 ￿ ￿ of unconnected sellers.
Notice that a connected seller is willing to extend credit to her trading partner in the
decentralized market provided that society can enforce any repayment in the centralized
location. One possible ￿nancial arrangement is to have a seller producing for the buyer
with whom she is paired in the day subperiod in exchange for a repayment in the night
subperiod. However, a buyer cannot commit to his promise of making a repayment in the
night subperiod. To enforce the repayment of private liabilities, there must be some form
of societal punishment on defaulters. Otherwise, a seller would not be willing to produce
for a buyer in the decentralized market unless she received something tangible and valuable
in exchange (such as ￿at money). This must be the case for an unconnected seller who is
unable to make her trades publicly observable. On the other hand, a connected seller has the
5ability to make her transaction with a buyer publicly observable. If a buyer does not repay
his loan, other agents in the economy will observe his defection. If there exists a mechanism
that enforces any repayment in the centralized location, a connected seller is willing to
extend credit to her trading partners in the decentralized market. In the next section, we
provide more details on the exact punishment that society can impose on defaulters.
3. MONETARY ECONOMY
As a benchmark, we describe in this section an equilibrium without intervention so that
agents are endowed with a ￿xed stock of money. To enforce the repayment of private
liabilities, there is a clearinghouse that collects all reports from connected sellers in the day
subperiod. The clearinghouse is also responsible for receiving repayments from buyers and
making payments to sellers in the centralized location. Any transaction that is reported
to the clearinghouse becomes publicly observable. Because a buyer cannot commit to his
promises, the clearinghouse needs to impose some kind of punishment on him if he fails to
make a repayment. It is not possible for the clearinghouse to directly punish a buyer who
has defaulted on his loan. However, the clearinghouse can indirectly punish a defaulter by
refusing to make a payment (in the centralized location) to any seller who trades with him.
Notice that the identity of a defaulter is publicly observable. As a result, a connected seller
will not be willing to extend credit to a defaulter. To extend credit to him, the seller would
have to report their transaction, together with their identities, to the clearinghouse, which
would then refuse to make a transfer to the seller even if it received a repayment from the
buyer in the centralized location. Thus, a buyer who reneges on her liability loses access
to credit: A connected seller may be willing to produce for him in exchange for ￿at money
but is not willing to extend credit.
Each buyer is endowed with ￿ M units of ￿at money. A buyer can choose whether to have
his transaction with a connected seller reported to the clearinghouse. If the buyer chooses
not to report his trade, then credit will not be available to him: The seller cannot enforce
the repayment of a private liability in the centralized location and, as a result, is not willing
6to extend credit. In this case, the seller is willing to produce for the buyer only if she receives
￿at money in exchange as the unconnected seller does not have access to a record-keeping
technology. Hence, credit is incentive-feasible only in a bilateral meeting between a buyer
and a connected seller.
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), there is a Walrasian market in the centralized location in
which agents can trade goods for ￿at money at a competitive price. Trades in this market
are always anonymous. To determine the terms of trade in the decentralized market, we
assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the seller, who either accepts or
rejects it.4 As a result, the buyer extracts all surplus from trade when proposing the terms
of trade. This particular bargaining protocol simpli￿es the analysis without compromising
the generality of our results. In Lagos and Wright (2005) there is an ine¢ ciency arising
from the generalized Nash bargaining solution: If the seller has some bargaining power, the
￿rst-best allocation cannot be implemented as a monetary equilibrium.5 To concentrate
on the informational frictions that we emphasize in this paper, we simplify the analysis by
ruling out any potential bargaining ine¢ cient.
3.1. Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
Consider the bargaining problem between a buyer and an unconnected seller. Let ￿t
denote the value of money in the centralized location at date t, and suppose that the buyer





subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q + ￿tD ￿ 0, (3)
4Here we implicitly assume that it is in￿nitely costly for the buyer to make a second o⁄er to the seller if
the ￿rst one has been rejected.
5Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010) show that in order to obtain the ￿rst-best ￿scal policies need
to be active.
7and the buyer￿ s cash constraint,
D ￿ M. (4)
Here the seller produces q units of the consumption good for the buyer in exchange for D
units of money. The solution to this problem is: q = q￿ and D = q￿=￿t if M ￿ q￿=￿t;
or q = ￿tM and D = M if M < q￿=￿t. Finally, the buyer￿ s payo⁄ of trading with an






u(￿tM) if M < q￿=￿t,
u(q￿) if M ￿ q￿=￿t.
(5)
3.2. Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Now consider the bargaining problem between a buyer and a connected seller. First, we
describe the solution to the bargaining problem, assuming that the buyer wants to have
his trade reported. Let v denote the buyer￿ s expected discounted utility after making a
repayment in night subperiod. Similarly, let ^ v represent the buyer￿ s expected discounted
utility following default in the night subperiod. Taking ￿t, v, ^ v, ￿ as given, the buyer￿ s




[u(q) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD],
subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q ￿ ￿ + ￿tL + ￿tD ￿ 0, (6)
the buyer￿ s cash constraint (4), and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿￿tL + v ￿ ^ v. (7)
Here the seller produces q units of the consumption good for the buyer in exchange for D
units of money and a promise of repayment of L units of money in the centralized location.
The buyer produces ￿tL units of the good in exchange for L units of money in the Walrasian
market and makes a transfer to the clearinghouse, which in turn makes a payment L to the
seller with whom he was paired in the day subperiod. There is no cost of operating the
8clearinghouse other than the cost of reporting a transaction. A seller needs to pay ￿ > 0 to
report her transaction with her trading partner in the decentralized market, which makes
it harder to satisfy her individual rationality constraint. Because (6) holds with equality at
the optimum, the buyer ends up paying for the record-keeping cost. The bene￿t of having
his trade reported is that the buyer can consume more than what his money holdings permit
him to purchase because he can promise to make a repayment to the seller in the centralized
location through the clearinghouse. Although credit is costly for the buyer, it allows him
to relax his cash constraint.
The unconstrained solution to the bargaining problem is ￿tL+￿tD￿￿ = q￿. This means
that, if ￿tM ￿ ￿ < q￿, we must have D = M and L > 0 at the optimum. Thus, we can
rewrite the buyer￿ s problem as
￿r
t (M) = max
L￿0
[u(￿tL + ￿tM ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿tL], (8)
subject to (7). The solution to this problem is: L = (q￿ ￿ ￿tM + ￿)=￿t if q￿ ￿ ￿tM + ￿ ￿
v ￿ ^ v or L = (v ￿ ^ v)=￿t if q￿ ￿ ￿tM + ￿ > v ￿ ^ v. Finally, the seller sends the report
f(i;j);(q;D;L)g to the clearinghouse, where i 2 [0;1] is the buyer￿ s identity, j 2 [0;1] is
the seller￿ s identity, and (q;D;L) are the terms of trade.
Suppose now that the buyer chooses not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse.
In this case, any trade proposed by the buyer that involves a positive repayment amount
will be rejected by the seller. Thus, the buyer￿ s problem is the same as the one he faces
when meeting with an unconnected seller in the decentralized market.
3.3. Buyer￿ s Bellman Equation
In a stationary monetary equilibrium, each buyer anticipates that the value of money in
the centralized location will be constant over time: ￿t = ￿ > 0 for all t ￿ 0. The buyer￿ s
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t+1 (M) given by (8) and ￿a
t+1 (M) given by (5). Here M is the amount of money
that the buyer acquires in the Walrasian market at date t and takes with him into the
decentralized market at date t+1. Let M￿ denote his optimal choice of money holdings in
the Walrasian market.
Now we make the same change of variables as in Sanches and Williamson (2010), which
will prove to be useful for describing an equilibrium allocation. Let y denote the buyer￿ s
daytime consumption if he reports his trade to the clearinghouse and let x denote his




t+1 (M￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿M￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
In this case, the buyer chooses to report his trade with a connected seller to other agents in
order to have access to credit. We can rewrite equation (9) in terms of x and y as follows:
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x],
with the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint (7) given by
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ^ v.
When making his portfolio decision in the centralized location at date t, a buyer ￿nds it
optimal to carry some currency into the decentralized market at date t+1 because he may
be matched with an unconnected seller (with probability 1 ￿ ￿). In this case, trade takes
place only if he has money to pay for his purchase. Even in a trade with a connected seller
that is reported to the clearinghouse, the buyer may use both credit and ￿at money to pay
for the amount y that the seller produces for him.




t+1 (M￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
< ￿￿M￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
In this case, the cost associated with credit exceeds the bene￿t of trading with credit. As
a result, the buyer never reports his trade when he is paired with a connected seller. Thus,
10he always uses ￿at money to pay for his purchase in the decentralized market. We can then
rewrite equation (9) as follows:
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿x + ￿u(x),
with the value of x given by
u0 (^ x) = ￿￿1. (10)
For ￿at money and private debt to coexist as means of payment, the following must hold
in equilibrium:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿^ x + ￿u(^ x). (11)
Otherwise, an equilibrium is one in which all trade in the decentralized market is carried
out with only ￿at money.
3.4. The Value of Defection
If a buyer fails to make a repayment in the centralized location, he will be able to use
only ￿at currency to pay for his future purchases. When a buyer fails to make a repayment,
the clearinghouse makes his defection publicly observable. This means that, if a defaulter
wants to have any of his future trades reported, his identity will be revealed to his trading
partner. The latter (a connected seller) knows that the clearinghouse will refuse to make a
transfer to her in the centralized location even if a repayment is actually collected from the
buyer. Because the proposed trade would involve a positive repayment amount (otherwise,
the buyer would prefer not to report the trade), she would get a negative payo⁄if she carried
out the proposed trade. As a result, the seller will not accept the terms proposed by the
buyer. Taking this into account, a defaulter who is paired with a connected seller chooses
not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse because this option would involve a
cost without any additional bene￿t. Thus, the value of defection ^ v satis￿es the following
Bellman equation:
^ v = max
^ M2R+
n









11Let z denote the buyer￿ s consumption following defection. Then, we can rewrite (12) as
follows:
(1 ￿ ￿) ^ v = ￿z + ￿u(z).
A defaulter produces and sells z units of the consumption good in the Walrasian market in
order to acquire enough money balances at date t to purchase z units of the good in the
decentralized market at date t + 1. We have that z = ^ x, with ^ x satisfying (10).
3.5. Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to stationary monetary equilibria for which
aggregate real money balances are constant over time. With constant money supply, this
means that the value of money in the centralized location is constant over time. The
distribution of money holdings at the end of the night subperiod is such that every buyer
holds the same amount of money and that sellers carry no money into the decentralized
market. This result is a direct consequence of the quasilinearity with respect to labor supply
and that agents have periodic access to centralized trade; see Lagos and Wright (2005) and
Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Hence, we can characterize an equilibrium allocation in terms
of the daytime consumption of a buyer who has his trade reported to the clearinghouse and
the daytime consumption of a buyer who does not have his trade reported, together with
the daytime consumption that a buyer would get had he defaulted on his private liability.
De￿nition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium with credit is a triple (x;y;z), with z = ^ x,
satisfying the nonnegativity of the repayment amount
y ￿ x + ￿ ￿ 0, (13)
the ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice of money balances,
￿u0 (y) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 (x) = ￿￿1, (14)
and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿^ x + ￿u(^ x), (15)
12with y = q￿ if (15) does not bind.
Notice that (13) and (15) imply that (11) holds. An equilibrium in which ￿at money and
private debt are used as a means of payment has to be one in which a buyer who is paired
with a connected seller ￿nds it optimal to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse,
despite the cost associated with this choice. Equations (14) and (15) characterize the
consumption plans x and y. Note that if we set y = q￿ and obtain x from (14). If (13) and
(15) are satis￿ed, the socially e¢ cient quantity q￿ is traded in each bilateral trade between
a buyer and a connected seller. Otherwise, (14) and (15) holding with equality determine
the values of x and y. Similarly, we need to verify whether (13) is satis￿ed. If there exists
no (x;y;z) satisfying (13)-(15), together with z = ^ x, then an equilibrium is one in which all
trade in the decentralized market is carried out with ￿at money (Buyers never report their
trades to the clearinghouse and, as a result, credit disappears.). In this equilibrium, the
quantity ^ x is traded in every meeting in the decentralized market. In the night subperiod,
each buyer then produces ^ x and each seller consumes ^ x.
In an equilibrium in which ￿at money and private debt coexist, we have that x ￿ y,
which means that a buyer who reports his trade to the clearinghouse is able to consume
more than a buyer who cannot obtain credit from his trading partner. From a buyer￿ s
standpoint, there is consumption risk. A buyer who trades with an unconnected seller faces
a cash constraint that can eventually bind. On the other hand, a buyer who trades with
a connected seller can promise to make a repayment in the centralized location in order to
consume more than what his money holdings permit him to purchase in the decentralized
market. So long as the repayment amount is individually rational, a buyer who trades with
a connected seller will be able to consume more in the day subperiod.
Although the possibility of trading with credit in the decentralized market seems attrac-
tive for buyers, the following result shows that there can be no equilibrium in which money
and private debt coexist.
Proposition 2 With a constant money supply, the unique stationary monetary equilibrium
is a pure monetary equilibrium in which the quantity ^ x is traded in the decentralized market.
13Proof. Notice that for any pair (x;y),
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x]
< ￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)y + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x]
￿ u(￿￿y + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)y ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)x
￿ ￿^ x + ￿u(^ x).
In the second step, we have used the fact that the utility function u : R+ ! R+ is strictly
concave. Hence, the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint (15) cannot be satis￿ed for
any (x;y). This implies that there can be no credit in equilibrium. As a result, the unique
stationary monetary equilibrium is one in which ^ x is traded in each bilateral meeting in the
decentralized market. Q.E.D.
The previous proposition showed that the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint cannot
be satis￿ed in equilibrium. This means that there is no incentive-feasible repayment amount.
Any buyer would prefer to renege on his liability in the centralized location and use ￿at
currency to pay for all of his future purchases in the decentralized market. Hence, the
credit system is not used in equilibrium. In the subsequent section, we study the possibility
of government intervention. There, we will show that there exists a critical value for the
money growth rate above which the credit system becomes operative. Moreover, we will
show that the critical value for the money growth rate is above zero.
This result is also observed in Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007). Like our model, the
credit system in their model is endogenous, and the repayment of debt has to be incentive
compatible. Our intuition for the previous result is similar to theirs. A buyer who traded
with a connected seller and promised to make a repayment in the centralized location has
to produce more goods in the Walrasian market to settle his liability relative to a buyer
who traded with an unconnected seller. Notice that both the buyer and the seller rebalance
their currency portfolio in the same way since there are no wealth e⁄ects (due to quasilinear
preferences). With zero in￿ ation, agents are able to self-insure at a low cost, which means
that having access to costly credit is of no value. A similar result also arises in Aiyagari and
14Williamson (2000), although in their environment the informational structure is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent.
4. WELFARE-IMPROVING POLICIES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC
INFORMATION
In this section, we consider the possibility of government intervention. Any intervention
must result in a net transfer of ￿at money to private agents in order to respect the constraint
that all trades have to be voluntary, as in Andolfatto (2010). Moreover, any transfer must
be conditional on the public information created by the private sector. We implicitly assume
that the government lacks the technology to verify agents￿identity and observe their trades.
Notice that this kind of intervention creates an additional incentive for agents to report their
trades: Not only do public transactions allow credit arrangements within the private sector,
but they also permit an agent to receive a net transfer of ￿at money.
Any information the government has about the economy is necessarily reported by agents.
As a result, the government needs to interact with the clearinghouse to implement any
policy because the interest payment can be made only to those who have reported their
trades and identities to the clearinghouse. Recall that the clearinghouse keeps a public
record of reports and identities. Speci￿cally, an agent who holds M units of money in the
decentralized market can transform his balance into RM ￿T units of money. Here R is the
gross nominal interest rate announced by the government and T represents a redemption
fee.
The government can intervene in the economy only if the clearinghouse is used to settle
private transactions. The government can induce agents to report their trades by paying
interest on money holdings; that is, the bene￿t of reporting a trade is not only to have
access to credit but also to be able to receive an interest payment. However, if it is very
expensive to report a transaction, then a buyer who is paired with a connected seller may
prefer not to use credit nor to receive an interest payment; as a result, the clearinghouse is
not used. In this case, all trade is carried out with ￿at currency. Thus, all transactions in
15the economy are anonymous and the government cannot intervene.
4.1. Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
An unconnected seller is unable to report her trade in the decentralized market to the
clearinghouse. Thus, she will not be willing to extend credit to the buyer because no
repayment amount can be enforced in the centralized location. Moreover, neither the buyer
nor the seller is able to receive an interest payment because they are unable to contact the
clearinghouse in the day subperiod. As a result, the bargaining problem between a buyer
and an unconnected seller is exactly the same as the one described in section 3. Thus, the
buyer￿ s payo⁄ of trading with an unconnected seller, denoted by ￿n
t (M), is given by (5).
4.2. Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Here we describe the bargaining problem between a buyer and a connected seller. Suppose
￿rst that the buyer wants to have his trade reported. De￿ne ’t (D) = maxfD;RtD ￿ Ttg.




[u(q) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD],
subject to the seller￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿q ￿ ￿ + ￿tL + ￿t’t (D) ￿ 0,
the buyer￿ s cash constraint (4), and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint (7). If
the buyer chooses not to trade with the seller in the day subperiod, he will not be able
to receive an interest payment because there will be no transaction to be reported to the
clearinghouse. For this reason, the buyer￿ s surplus from trade is given by u(q)￿￿tL￿￿tD.
Suppose that Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1 < (q￿ + ￿ + ￿tTt)=￿tRt. Now if ￿t maxfRtM ￿ Tt;Mg￿￿ <
q￿, then we must have D = M and L > 0 at the optimum. The buyer￿ s surplus from trade
as a function of D and L is
Sr
t (D;L) = u(￿tL + ￿tD ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD,
16if 0 < D < Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1, or
Sr
t (D;L) = u(￿tL + ￿t (RtD ￿ Tt) ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿tL ￿ ￿tD,
if D ￿ Tt (Rt ￿ 1)





subject to (7). If the constraint (7) binds, we have that L = (v ￿ ^ v)=￿t. Otherwise, the
repayment amount is given by
L = (q￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿tM)=￿t if M < Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1
or
L = [q￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿t (RtM ￿ Tt)]=￿t if Tt (Rt ￿ 1)
￿1 ￿ M < (q￿ + ￿ + ￿tTt)=￿tRt.
Again, let ￿r
t (M) denote the buyer￿ s payo⁄of trading with a connected seller (as a function
of his money holdings) when the trade is reported to the clearinghouse. Finally, the seller
sends the report f(i;j);(q;D;L)g to the clearinghouse.
Suppose now that the buyer chooses not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse.
Then, the buyer￿ s problem is the same as the one he faces when meeting with an unconnected
seller.
4.3. Government￿ s Budget Constraint
The government￿ s budget constraint is given by
￿Tt + ￿ Mt ￿ ￿ Mt￿1 = (Rt ￿ 1)￿ ￿ Mt￿1.
We have anticipated that, in a monetary equilibrium, all buyers who have access to credit
choose to use it by reporting their trades to the clearinghouse. We have also anticipated
that, at the beginning of the day subperiod at date t, each buyer holds ￿ Mt￿1 units of money
and that sellers carry no money into the decentralized market. We will show later that, in
a monetary equilibrium, this will be the endogenous distribution of money holdings across
17agents at the beginning of the day subperiod. As a result, aggregate interest payment is
(R ￿ 1)￿ ￿ Mt￿1, with an aggregate revenue from the redemption fee equal to ￿Tt.
We restrict attention to monetary policy rules for which the money supply grows at a
constant gross rate ￿ > 0 ( ￿ Mt = ￿ ￿ Mt￿1 for all t ￿ 0) and the gross interest rate is constant
over time (Rt = R ￿ 1 for all t ￿ 0).6 Thus, we can rewrite the government￿ s budget










4.4. Buyer￿ s Bellman Equation
Each buyer takes the value of money f￿tg
1




as given when making his individual decisions. The buyer￿ s problem can be formulated in












+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M) + v
￿￿
. (17)
Let M￿ denote the solution to the maximization problem on the right-hand side of (17).
Conjecture that, in a monetary equilibrium, agents ￿nd it optimal to exercise the option of




t+1 (M￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿tM￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
Thus, we can rewrite (17) as
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x],
with the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint given by




x+(1 ￿ ￿) ^ v.
We have that y = q￿ if the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint does not bind so that
the socially e¢ cient quantity will be traded in each bilateral meeting that is reported to
the clearinghouse.
6We show later that stationary equilibria with ￿ < 1 are not incentive compatible because agents would
prefer not to exercise the option of receiving interest payment from the government.




t+1 (M￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a
t+1 (M￿)
￿
< ￿￿tM￿ + ￿￿a
t+1 (M￿).
Then, we can rewrite (17) as
(1 ￿ ￿)v = ￿￿~ x + ￿u(~ x),
with ~ x given by




In this case, a buyer who is paired with a connected seller chooses not to report his trade
so that he exclusively uses ￿at money to pay for his purchases in the decentralized market.
Finally, for ￿at money and private debt to coexist as means of payment, the following
condition must hold in equilibrium:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿x + ￿￿ [u(y) ￿ y ￿ ￿] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿￿~ x + ￿u(~ x). (19)
Otherwise, an equilibrium is one in which all trade in the decentralized market is carried
out with ￿at money.
4.5. The Value of Defection
We assume that the government refuses to make interest payment to a defaulter.7 Thus,
the value of defection ^ v satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
^ v = max
^ M2R+
n









Let z denote the buyer￿ s consumption following defection. Then, we can rewrite (20) as
(1 ￿ ￿) ^ v = ￿￿z + ￿u(z),
7This assumption ensures that a defaulter will be able to trade in the decentralized market only with
￿at money. Not only a defaulter loses access to credit, but he is not able to receive interest payment from
the government. One important implication is that a higher in￿ ation rate punishes defaulters and induces
cooperation in the credit market.
19Upon defaulting on a private liability, a buyer produces and sells ￿z units of the consumption
good in the Walrasian market to acquire money balances at date t. Then, he takes these
proceeds into the decentralized market at date t + 1 to purchase z units of the good. We
have that z = ~ x.
4.6. Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
In a stationary monetary equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings across agents
at the beginning of the day subperiod at date t is such that each buyer holds ￿ Mt￿1 units
of money and sellers have no money. The distribution of money holdings at the beginning
of the night subperiod at date t is such that each seller holds ￿ Mt units of money and
buyers have no money. A buyer ￿nds it optimal to receive interest payment if and only if
(R ￿ 1)x ￿ T ￿ 0. Using (16), this condition holds if and only if:
￿ ￿ 1 (21)
and
R ￿ 1. (22)
For a monetary equilibrium to exist, we also need to have that:
￿￿t + ￿R￿t+1 ￿ 0, (23)
at each date t. Otherwise, agents will demand an in￿nite amount of money in the Walrasian
market and a monetary equilibrium would not exist. In a stationary monetary equilibrium,







A stationary monetary equilibrium in which aggregate real money balances are constant
over time necessarily satis￿es (24). As a result, a government￿ s policy (￿;R) needs to
satisfy (21), (22), and (24) to be incentive-feasible.
De￿nition 3 For any given incentive-feasible policy (￿;R), a stationary monetary equilib-
rium with credit is a triple (x;y;z), with z = ~ x, satisfying the nonnegativity of the repayment
20amount,







the ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice of money balances,




and the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint,
￿￿u(y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(y + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x]




x ￿ ￿~ x + ￿u(~ x), (27)
with y = q￿ if (27) does not bind.
Notice that (25) and (27) imply that (19) holds. If an equilibrium with credit exists, we
can have either an unconstrained equilibrium (in which case the buyer gets y = q￿ from a
connected seller) or a constrained equilibrium (in which case the buyer gets y < q￿ from
a connected seller). If a stationary monetary equilibrium with credit does not exist, then
the unique stationary equilibrium is a pure monetary equilibrium in which the quantity ^ x
is traded in each bilateral meeting in the decentralized market. In this case, there can be
no intervention because no public information is created (all trades are anonymous) so that
the money supply remains constant over time.
4.7. Optimal Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal policy rule subject to the implementation
constraint that all trade has to be voluntary and that all monetary transfers to private agents
have to be conditional on the public information available. The social welfare associated
with an equilibrium with credit (x;y;z) is given by:
￿ [u(y) ￿ y] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x) ￿ x] ￿ ￿￿, (28)
and the social welfare associated with an equilibrium without credit is
u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. (29)
21Without a credit system, the only allocation that can be implemented (other than autarky)
is one in which each buyer gets ^ x from a seller in the decentralized market and produces ^ x
in the centralized location. All trades are anonymous so that the private sector does not
create any public information on which the government can condition its transfers.
Notice that x = y = q￿ maximizes the social welfare associated with an equilibrium with
credit. If we can implement the socially e¢ cient quantity q￿, then the maximum welfare
level is given by
u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿￿.
We say that a society has low record-keeping cost if the following holds:
u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿￿ > u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. (30)
In this case, the equilibrium with credit dominates the pure monetary equilibrium without
intervention, provided that the socially e¢ cient quantity q￿ can be implemented by an
incentive-feasible policy. Thus, our ￿rst step is to verify whether the socially e¢ cient
quantity can indeed be implemented.
Lemma 4 x ￿ ~ x in an unconstrained monetary stationary equilibrium.












Because the utility function u : R+ ! R+ is strictly concave, we conclude that x ￿ ~ x as
claimed. Q.E.D.
The previous result shows that we must have x = ~ x = q￿ in order to implement the
socially e¢ cient allocation. However, we show next that there is no incentive-feasible policy
that can implement x = ~ x = q￿ as an unconstrained equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The socially e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented as a stationary
monetary equilibrium.












which means that the maximum consumption amount (in an unconstrained equilibrium)
that a buyer who is paired with an unconnected seller can get is ^ x < q￿. Since the socially
e¢ cient allocation can be implemented only as an unconstrained equilibrium, (31) implies
that such an allocation is infeasible. Q.E.D.
It is not possible for the government to eliminate the consumption risk that a buyer
faces in the decentralized market (in an unconstrained equilibrium). With probability ￿, a
buyer consumes q￿ because his trade is reported to the clearinghouse, and with probability
1￿￿, he consumes less than q￿ because his money holdings are insu¢ cient to purchase the
quantity q￿ from his trading partner. The government cannot induce him to carry more
money balances into the decentralized market so that the e¢ cient quantity cannot be traded
in a bilateral meeting between a buyer and an unconnected seller.
We now characterize the optimal monetary policy rule under the assumption that the
buyer has CRRA preferences.






, with the coe¢ cient of rel-
ative risk aversion satisfying ￿ < 1 and with b 2 (0;1).





growth factor ￿ ￿ > 1; provided that the measure of connected sellers in the economy is
su¢ ciently large. The money growth factor ￿ ￿ is such that the buyer￿ s individual rationality
constraint holds with equality in an unconstrained equilibrium. In this case, the buyer
is indi⁄erent between defaulting on his private liability and making a repayment to the
clearinghouse. The next proposition shows how to uniquely determine ￿ ￿.
Proposition 6 For ￿ small and ￿ ￿ ￿, there exists a unique ￿ ￿ > 1 such that, with x = ~ x
and y = q￿, (25) holds as a strict inequality and (27) holds with equality. As a result,
23(x;y;z) = (~ x;q￿; ~ x) is an unconstrained stationary monetary equilibrium in which the re-
payment amount is strictly positive.
Proof. De￿ne the function ’(￿) by
’(￿) = ￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(~ x) ￿ ~ x]




(1 ￿ ￿) ~ x.
Under Assumption 1, we have that ’0 (￿) > 0 for all ￿. Notice that ’(￿) < 0. Also, we
have that
’(1) = ￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿) ￿ [￿￿u(^ x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿) ^ x] < 0.
Finally, notice that ’(￿) > 0 for ￿ su¢ ciently large. To verify this claim, observe that
￿￿u(q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(q￿ + ￿) > 0
for ￿ su¢ ciently close to one. Also, we have that, for any ￿ ￿ 1,




(￿ ￿ 1) ~ x.
Because both ~ x ! 0 and ￿~ x ! 0 as ￿ ! 1, we must have ’(￿) > 0 for some ￿ su¢ ciently
large. As a result, there exists a unique ￿ ￿ > 1 such that (27) holds with equality at x = ~ x
and y = q￿.
Now we need to verify whether the repayment amount is nonnegative. De￿ne the function
  (￿) by






1 + ￿￿1 (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
,
which gives the repayment amount as a function of ￿. We have that  0 (￿) > 0 for all
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿). Notice that (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿. Because
  (1) > 0, we have that   (￿) is strictly increasing for any ￿ ￿ 1. This means that for
the value ￿ ￿ such that ’(￿ ￿) = 0 we also have that   (￿ ￿) > 0. Therefore, we conclude that
(x;y;z) = (~ x;q￿; ~ x), with ~ x given by
u0 (~ x) = ￿￿1￿ ￿,
24is an unconstrained stationary monetary equilibrium. Q.E.D.
With CRRA preferences, the repayment amount in an unconstrained equilibrium is
strictly increasing in the money growth factor ￿, which means that the higher the long-
run in￿ ation rate (which is also given by ￿), the larger the repayment amount is. As we
would expect, credit becomes relatively more important in transactions as the in￿ ation rate
rises.
Notice that the buyer￿ s individual rationality constraint can only be satis￿ed for values
of ￿ above the threshold value ￿ ￿, which means that a stationary monetary equilibrium
in which the credit system is operative exists if and only if the money growth factor is
su¢ ciently large (in particular, above the threshold value ￿ ￿).
Finally, we need to verify whether the welfare associated with the allocation (~ x;q￿; ~ x) is
greater than the welfare associated with the equilibrium without credit (the pure monetary
equilibrium ^ x). Speci￿cally, we need to verify whether the following holds:
￿ [u(q￿) ￿ q￿] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(~ x) ￿ ~ x] ￿ ￿￿ > u(^ x) ￿ ^ x. (32)
This condition holds if ￿ is close to one and the record-keeping cost ￿ is small. This means
that only a society with a su¢ ciently sophisticated record-keeping technology can bene￿t
from public transactions. Not only do public transactions allow credit arrangements within
the private sector, but they also permit the government to alter the rate of return on money.
If the fraction of transactions that is reported in equilibrium is large relative to those that




on social welfare is
bigger. This means that public trades are socially desirable so long as the cost of reporting
private trades is low and the relative fraction of these trades is su¢ ciently large.
5. DISCUSSION
In Andolfatto (2010), the policy rule (￿;R) =
￿
1;￿￿1￿
, which is a version of the Fried-
man rule, implements the socially e¢ cient allocation in a pure monetary economy. In this
equilibrium, the price level is constant over time so that the long-run in￿ ation rate is zero.
25If we impose the additional constraint that all transfers of ￿at money to private agents
have to be conditional on the available public information, then we ￿nd that, with CRRA
preferences, the optimal policy rule is a deviation from
￿
1;￿￿1￿
. For an economy with ￿





with ￿ ￿ > 1, is pretty close to
￿
1;￿￿1￿
. As a result, the optimal monetary policy results in
a small but strictly positive long-run in￿ ation rate.
As in Andolfatto￿ s analysis, money is an interest-bearing government liability. The key
di⁄erence of our analysis relative to Andolfatto￿ s is that, because of the additional frictions
in the environment, not all agents are able to receive an interest payment on their money
holdings. This means that, from an agent￿ s standpoint, money is an interest-bearing asset
with probability ￿. In our model, there is an endogenous credit system that allows buyers
to relax (at a cost) their cash constraints when making their purchases in the goods market.
Because agents cannot commit to their promises, the e⁄ective functioning of the credit
system creates public information regarding private trades to enforce the repayment of
private liabilities through societal punishments. Given that the government is unable to
contact anonymous agents in the (decentralized) goods market, only those who decide to
report their trades are able to receive an interest payment on their money holdings. As a
result, asymmetric injections of ￿at money arise in our environment due to informational
frictions.
6. CONCLUSION
We have constructed a model in which private debt and interest-bearing government
liabilities coexist as a means of payment. The credit system is endogenous and allows
buyers to relax their cash constraints when trading in the goods market. Such a system is
costly for society because private agents have to report (at a cost) their trades to others in
the economy, which is necessary for the enforcement of private liabilities. The government is
unable to contact anonymous agents in the goods market, which in our model implies that
injections of ￿at money are asymmetric. As a result, from an agent￿ s standpoint, ￿at money
26is an interest-bearing asset only with a certain probability: Only agents who have their
trades publicly reported are able to receive an interest payment from the government. In
our analysis, the asymmetric e⁄ects of monetary policy arise due to informational frictions.
The Friedman rule is infeasible, and the socially e¢ cient allocation cannot be imple-
mented as an equilibrium. We characterized the optimal monetary policy rule with CRRA
preferences for an economy with a large fraction of connected sellers (who can potentially
make their trades publicly observable) and with a low record-keeping cost. The optimal
policy results in a strictly positive long-run in￿ ation rate and nominal interest rate. This
means that the constraint that all transfers of ￿at money to private agents have to be con-
ditional on the available public information is relevant for monetary policy implementation.
The kinds of informational friction that we have emphasize in this paper are likely to arise
in real-world monetary policymaking. These frictions provide a rationale for targeting a
strictly positive in￿ ation rate in the long run, which seems to be the norm among central
banks of developed economies.
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